Recent Cases
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville (2008)
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on this case on October 8, 2008.
In 2001, the metropolitan government of Nashville and Davidson County (Metro) hired Gene Hughes to oversee employment relations for their school district. As part of his job, Hughes was required to investigate all claims of discrimination and harassment filed in the district. Eventually, Hughes himself became subject to a number of sexual harassment complaints and an investigation began. During the investigation, Metro officials asked Vicky Crawford, who worked under Hughes, if she had seen any inappropriate conduct by Hughes.
Crawford told investigators that she had seen Hughes engage in inappropriate workplace behavior at various times. Hughes grabbed his crotch, asked to see Crawford’s breasts, and even forcibly pulled Crawford’s head to his crotch. Crawford had not previously filed a complaint against Hughes and merely told investigators of these events when asked during the course of the investigation.
The investigation of Hughes’s conduct resulted in no disciplinary action. Upon the investigation’s conclusion, however, Crawford and other female employees who had testified to Hughes’s conduct were fired.
Title VII forbids employers from retaliating against workers for voicing opposition to sexual harassment practices or for participating in any investigation conducted under the same statute.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that, assuming Crawford’s allegations were true, Metro had not violated Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. In doing so, the court said that the anti-retaliation clause only protects those who actively resist workplace discrimination — those who make an official complaint, either to their employer or to the government. Protection does not extend to employees who merely participate in an in-house investigation. The court further held that the participation clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision applies only to statements made during proceedings held after official charges were filed with the EEOC.
Crawford appealed that decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard the case this fall. AAUW joined an amicus brief written by the National Women’s Law Center in Support of Vicky Crawford, which was then filed with the court. A transcript of the oral argument from October 8, 2008, is available, and a decision will be issued in 2009.
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Other cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court
1. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986)
Mechelle Vinson filed suit against her former employer, Meritor Savings Bank, claiming that she had been subjected to sexual harassment by her supervisor in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vinson was a teller at Meritor Savings Bank, working under the supervision of Sidney Taylor, the vice president of the branch where she worked. Vinson worked at the bank for four years before she was fired in November 1978 for taking excessive leave.
Vinson brought suit against the bank, arguing that, during the four years she had been employed at the bank, she had been subjected to repeated sexual harassment by Taylor. At trial, Vinson testified that, at one point in the beginning of her employment, Taylor invited her out to dinner and suggested that they go to a motel to have sex. After initially refusing, Vinson eventually agreed to Taylor’s suggestion out of fear of losing her job. Vinson testified that Taylor made repeated demands for sexual favors after that first time, both during and after business hours, that Taylor fondled her in front of other employees, that he followed her into the women’s restroom when she went in there alone, and that he raped her on several occasions. Vinson said that she had not reported this harassment to any of Taylor’s supervisors because she was afraid of Taylor. Taylor denied all of Vinson’s allegations of sexual assault and harassment.
The trial court found that “[i]f [Vinson] and Taylor did engage in an intimate or sexual relationship during the time of [Vinson’s] employment with [the bank], that relationship was a voluntary one having nothing to do with her continued employment at [the bank] or her advancement or promotions at that institution.”1 The court found that Vinson was neither a victim of sexual harassment nor sexual discrimination while an employee of the bank. Vinson appealed the decision, and her case was eventually heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In rendering its decision, the court had to decide if a hostile work environment alone was a form of unlawful discrimination or if liability for sexual harassment was limited to "tangible economic discrimination". The court held that sexual harassment in the workplace is not so limited, stating that the intention of Congress was to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment. Meritor Bank established that “hostile work environment” harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2. Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993)
Teresa Harris worked as a manager for Forklift Systems from 1985 to 1987. Charles Hardy was Forklift’s president. Throughout Harris’s employment at Forklift, Hardy repeatedly insulted Harris because of her gender and subjected her to sexual innuendos. Hardy would often make inappropriate comments about Harris in front of co-workers, including “You're a woman, what do you know?” and “We need a man as the rental manager.” Hardy occasionally asked female employees to get coins out of his front pocket and threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and other female employees and asked them to bend over and pick up the coins.
In August 1987, Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct. He seemed surprised and told her that he was joking. He apologized and promised to stop the offending conduct. Based on this promise, Harris remained at her job. In September 1987, however, Hardy started the harassment again; he asked Harris in front of co-workers, “What did you do, promise the guy ... some [sex] Saturday night?” Harris quit her job in October 1987 and filed suit, claiming that Hardy's conduct had created an abusive work environment for her because of her gender.
The trial court considered this to be a “close case” but declined to hold that Hardy’s conduct created an abusive environment. While the court found that some of Hardy’s comments would offend “the reasonable woman,” the court did not find that his actions were so severe that they could be expected to affect Harris’s psychological well-being or her work performance. The court stated that it did not “believe that [Harris] was subjectively so offended that she suffered injury.... Although Hardy may at times have genuinely offended [Harris], I do not believe that he created a working environment so poisoned as to be intimidating or abusive to [Harris].”2
Harris appealed this decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court overturned it. In its opinion, the court stated that Title VII liability can be triggered without requiring that the “harassing conduct [to] lead[] to a nervous breakdown.”3 Rather, Title VII merely requires that the discriminatory conduct be so severe or pervasive that it creates an abusive workplace for someone based on their sex. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor went on to say that as long as the environment could “reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.”
3. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services (1998)
This case involved sexual harassment lawsuit brought by a male oil rig worker who claimed he was repeatedly harassed by his male co-workers. On several occasions, Oncale was subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions, including being sodomized with a bar of soap. Additionally, Oncale was threatened with rape. Oncale brought the harassment to the attention of his supervisors; instead of taking remedial action against the harassers, one of his safety supervisors called him a name. Eventually, Oncale quit his job and asked that his pink slip reflect that he “voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse.”4 When asked later at a deposition why he quit, Oncale replied that he felt had he not quit his job, he would have been raped or forced to have sex.
Oncale filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for Eastern Louisiana, but the court dismissed his claim, stating that “Mr. Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers.”5 The court of appeals affirmed the decision, and Oncale appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the decision.
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII’s protection against discrimination in the workplace “because of … sex” applies to harassment between members of the same sex. Additionally, it held that same-sex discrimination can occur not only in situations involving quid pro quo harassment, but also where a hostile work environment has been created. In doing so, the court recognized that many jurisdictions throughout the country had trouble deciding which series of facts would create situations in which sexual harassment was actionable.6
Oncale v. Sundowner set the precedent for analyzing same-sex sexual harassment discrimination suits. The Supreme Court held that any discrimination based on sex is actionable so long at it places the victim in a disadvantaged working condition, regardless of the gender of either the victim or the harasser.
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1 477 U.S. 57 at 61.
2 510 U.S. 17, 20.
Id. at 22.
4 Id
5 523 U.S. 75 at 77.
6 For example, some courts found that same-sex harassment was never actionable, while others stated that such claims would be valid only if they could prove the harasser was homosexual.
