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**ASK AND YOU SHALL RECEIVE?: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATORS'
BELIEFS ABOUT REQUESTS FOR A HIGHER SALARY**

RUNNING TITLE: Gender Differences in Negotiators' Beliefs

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ABSTRACT

Men and women have been shown to negotiate different salary amounts, but little research has investigated whether their behavior differs and how their beliefs might affect behavior. Using quantitative data from simulated negotiations and qualitative data from post-negotiation interviews, this study examines differences in the amounts of men's and women's salary requests and their beliefs about these requests. Qualitative data show differences in the nature of men's and women's beliefs about requesting a higher salary. Quantitative findings show men made significantly larger requests for salary than women and that beliefs were related to these requests. Theoretical implications are discussed.

KEYWORDS: NEGOTIATION, ENTITLEMENT, SALARY, GENDER

ASK AND YOU SHALL RECEIVE?: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATORS' BELIEFS ABOUT REQUESTS FOR A HIGHER SALARY

Differences in starting salaries can have a significant and lasting impact on employees' earnings and careers within an organization. For example, Gerhart (1990) showed that almost one third of the differences in men's and women's salaries in a large, private firm could be traced back to differences in starting salaries. These differences can also impact advancement. Rosenbaum (1984) found that initial earnings had a significant positive effect on employees' advancement after controlling for both individual attributes (tenure, entry age, education, race, and sex) and initial job status (a measure of the job level that included task demands, job requirements, salary, benefits, office size, and frequency of supervision). Given the importance of starting salaries, it is worth noting that researchers investigating in field and laboratory settings have found that men tend to negotiate higher starting salaries than women (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993). Although relatively small, such differences can amount to significant amounts of money over time (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Martell, Lane & Emrich, 1996) and could contribute to overall disparities in men's and women's wages (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991).

Research suggests gender differences in comfort with negotiation, negotiation approach, and sense of entitlement to higher pay might lead to differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes. Watson and Hoffman (1996) found that managerial women felt less confident when anticipating negotiation and less satisfied with their negotiation performance even though they achieved similar outcomes to men. Other research has shown that without self-management training, women feel lower self-efficacy about their salary negotiation ability (Stevens, Bavetta and Gist, 1993). In general, men are thought to have a bargaining advantage over women (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001).

Recently, scholars have called for research investigating men's and women's feelings and thoughts about negotiation, their negotiation outcomes (Kolb, 1993; Halpern & McLean-Parks,

1996) and the impact of the contexts in which they occur (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Despite such calls relatively little research has focused on gender and actual salary negotiation behavior and the beliefs and thoughts related to that behavior. Salary negotiations are one of the most common reoccurring negotiations individuals face and serve as a nexus for a variety of issues. Inherent in these negotiations is a tension between promoting and acquiring resources for oneself and joining and being accepted by organizational members. This tension is particularly manifested in requests for a higher salary. Initial requests, or initial offers, are significant because they can serve as anchors in the negotiation, influencing subsequent offers and final agreements (Chertkoff & Conley, 1967; Liebert, Smith, Hill, & Keiffer, 1968; Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972; Ritov, 1996; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). It is important, then, that we understand if men and women do make different salary requests and if so, why.

BACKGROUND

Researchers have suggested that men and women approach negotiation differently because they view the relational aspects of the negotiation differently (Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1995; Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1986; Halpern & McLean-Parks, 1996; Kolb, 1993). Men's and women's approaches to negotiation have been thought to differ in terms of long-term versus short-term interests, sensitivity to others, and seeing the negotiation relationship in a larger context versus as a separate interaction. Rosenberg (1989) found gender differences as early as adolescence, with girls evaluating harmony and sensitivity as more important than boys and boys evaluating toughness and dominance as more important than girls.

In their study Greenhalgh & Gilkey (1986) found feminine¹ negotiators conceived of the negotiation as an event in a long-term relationship and emphasized fairness. Masculine negotiators conceived of the negotiation as a "one-shot" deal and emphasized rules of the game

¹ Greenhalgh and Gilkey made a distinction between having a feminine and masculine orientation and being a woman or a man. In their framework, sex is not necessarily the same as feminine or masculine orientation. They contend that these orientations result from biological sex and developmental experiences.

(Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1986). Kolb (1993) argued that men tend to focus on individual achievement and activities defined in terms of task and structure, while women tend to see boundaries between themselves and others and between tasks and their surroundings as blurred or overlapping.

Rubin and Brown (1975) theorized that women might tend to be more responsive to the interpersonal aspects of the negotiation relationship and sensitive and reactive to variations in the other negotiator's behavior (high interpersonal orientation). Men might tend to be less likely to respond to the behavior of the other and primarily interested in their own gain (low interpersonal orientation). Major and Adams (1983), attempting to test this hypothesis, found women allocated rewards more equally than men, even when both men and women subjects were equivalent in their degree of interpersonal orientation. However, in a questionnaire administered after allocations had been made, women and individuals with a high interpersonal orientation indicated their allocations were motivated by concerns for their co-worker and that obtaining a positive evaluation from a co-worker was more important to them than it was to men or individuals with low personal orientation. While research on approaches to negotiation has generated many ideas about how men and women differ, little of this work has systematically investigated negotiators' expressed beliefs and linked them to behavior.

In addition to differences in approaches to negotiation, beliefs about entitlement to pay are likely to be relevant to salary negotiation. Major argued that entitlement beliefs are "key psychological mediators of how people react affectively, evaluatively, and behaviorally to their socially distributed outcomes." (1994: 298). There is considerable experimental (Major, 1987; Moore, 1991; Bylsma & Major, 1992; Major, 1994; Jost, 1997) and field (Moore, 1991) evidence that women feel entitled to less pay than men do. Bylsma and Major (1992) found that these differences in entitlement could be eradicated, however, when women and men were both exposed to the same social comparison conditions or the same performance feedback.

Research experiments and surveys have found that women expect less pay than men (Major & Konar, 1984; Martin, 1989; McFarlin, Frone, Major & Konar, 1989; Jackson, Gardner, & Sullivan, 1992) and view less pay as fair pay for their work (in the absence of external comparison standards) compared to men (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984). Pay expectations are likely to be shaped, in part, by social comparison information. Both men and women prefer to make same-sex comparisons when evaluating entitlement or outcomes (Major & Forcey, 1985; Major & Testa, 1989). Bylsma and Major (1994) found a strong preference for choosing one's own gender group as a comparison group even when such comparisons caused women to be satisfied with less pay. If women base their salary expectations on knowledge of other women's salaries only, they might set their salary expectations much lower than men do because women generally earn less than men (Frieze, Olson & Good, 1990; Stroh, Brett & Reilly, 1992). While these studies provide strong support for differences in men's and women's sense of entitlement to pay, they do not relate these beliefs to negotiation contexts and outcomes.

This study has two purposes: to investigate gender differences in negotiators' initial requests for a higher salary and to explore the beliefs that affect these requests. Data come from three sources: experimental behavioral negotiation simulations, semi-structured post-negotiation interviews, and pre- and post-negotiation questionnaires. Simulations are used to investigate differences in men's and women's requests for a higher salary, questionnaire data assess demographics and preferences, and interview data explore men's and women's beliefs. Based on existing research on entitlement (Major, 1994) and pay expectations (Major, Vanderslice, McFarlin, 1984) it is predicted that men will request higher salaries than women. Negotiators' beliefs about such requests are explored inductively. The relationship between negotiators' requests and beliefs emerging from the interviews is explored using regression analysis. This study contributes to negotiation research by investigating the impact of negotiators' beliefs on

initial requests for salary and helping us better understand the proximal causes of gender differences in salary negotiation.

METHOD

Participants

Twenty-one men and seventeen women second-year MBA student volunteers (referred to as “negotiators”) from a major university in the United States were randomly assigned to negotiate with a hiring manager. Negotiators were recruited through email, the school’s career center, and announcements made in classes. In exchange for participating in the study, negotiators could meet with a career counselor for feedback and win a cash raffle prize. Most were majoring in marketing (21 of 38) or interested in a marketing career. Marketing majors were chosen so that negotiators would have roughly the same expectations of salary and job type. MBA students were an appropriate subject pool since they were simultaneously interviewing for post-MBA jobs and many had negotiated their job offer or were planning to do so.

To reduce potential variation in negotiation approaches and behavior due to cultural and ethnic differences, only negotiators who had worked in the United States and spoke English fluently were asked to participate. Thirty-one of 38 were Caucasian, 2 were Asian-American, 1 was African-American, 1 was African and 3 declined to specify their ethnic backgrounds. Three human resource managers from local companies and one professional with hiring experience (referred to as “hiring managers”) represented a fictitious company, Indostar, in the simulations. Each hiring manager negotiated with approximately the same number of men and women, in no particular order, and was blind to the purpose of the study. All hiring managers were women, chosen for two reasons. First, the majority of hiring managers actually recruiting at the career center were women. Second, holding constant the gender of the hiring manager reduced one source of variation. While this potentially restricts the ability to generalize from these findings, the data are valid for the conditions described and help us theorize about these interactions.

Data Collection

Simulation rationale. Experimental behavioral simulations were designed to mirror naturally occurring salary negotiations (Gersick, 1989; see also Gist, Hopper & Daniels, 1998). Simulations had several advantages over other methods: 1) they created identical initial conditions but also allowed variable responses to those conditions, 2) they allowed actual rather than reported negotiation behaviors to be analyzed, and 3) they served as a stimulus for post-negotiation interviews in which beliefs, feelings, and reactions could be elicited. These conditions would have been difficult to achieve in the field due to variations in offers and circumstances and the sensitivity of such negotiations. Simulations took place in the career center interviewing rooms, negotiators wore interview attire, hiring managers had extensive experience negotiating, and graduating negotiators were interviewing for and negotiating actual job offers at the time of their participation. During interviews several negotiators commented on the similarities between their behavior in actual post-MBA and simulated negotiations.

Simulation design. Several days prior to negotiating, negotiators were offered a job with Indostar for a salary of \$61,000 and a bonus of \$5,000. This salary was slightly below what most MBA students from the school would expect for a marketing position at the time. Negotiators were informed that two other men and two other women MBA peers had received a job offer for a similar marketing position from a company like Indostar but with a salary that was 10% higher (approximately \$67,000) and a one-time starting bonus twice Indostar's (\$10,000). Negotiators were also provided information that would allow them to negotiate tuition reimbursement and vacation. They were told that the average MBA starting salary was \$63,000 and that they had a verbal offer for an undisclosed, but probably higher salary, from a company not as attractive as Indostar. Since MBA students typically know such information when they look for a job, it was given to them so they would have the same social comparison information. Hiring managers were told they could offer each negotiator a maximum salary of \$69,500,

wanted to hire all the negotiators, and needed to minimize personnel costs. Simulations were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim.

Post-negotiation interview design. Immediately after they participated in the negotiation, I interviewed thirty-six of the negotiators (two were not available to be interviewed). Semi-structured interviews lasted approximately twenty-five minutes, were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim. Questions included: How do you think the negotiation went? What do you think you have to do to get more in the negotiation? Do you think you have to justify your negotiation request? All negotiators filled out a post-negotiation questionnaire that gathered information about demographics, negotiation satisfaction, and career expectations.

Analyzing Data from Simulations

To identify negotiators' requests for a higher salary, I investigated each negotiation transcript. Thirty-five of the 38 negotiators requested a higher salary. Using t-tests, I compared the amount of men's and women's requests.

Analyzing Data from Interviews

To develop an understanding of the negotiators' beliefs related to requesting a higher salary, I coded post-negotiation interviews using an iterative process (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Lee, 1999) and entered codes and transcripts into a qualitative database (QSR Nudist). Codes pertained to negotiators' feelings, beliefs and descriptions of behaviors and captured a "chunk" of negotiators' remarks. A second researcher helped refine codes and transcripts were recoded. Once this was completed, an independent coder, blind to the negotiators' sex and the motivation for the study, coded all transcripts. We discussed and agreed upon final coded remarks. Inter-rater reliability, calculated in the manner recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) was .50 before discussion and .96 after discussion. Although initial inter-rater reliability was low, the categorization process employed six related codes "worth/value", "market average", "market premium", "entitlement", "prove self A", and "prove self B" each of which described abstract

and complex, rather than simple concepts. Hundreds of transcript pages were coded. Discussion allowed the complexities to be surfaced, debated and often, though not always, resolved. (See Appendix A for codes).

To explain differences in the salary amounts requested, I searched the database for coded remarks related to requesting a higher salary and examined these excerpts and their place in the interview transcript. I looked for differences, similarities, and relationships to identify themes. I “tested” my ideas about these themes as I examined each new excerpt (Sutton, 1991; Miles & Huberman, 1994). This iterative and inductive process resulted in the discovery of three themes: *worth*, *entitlement*, and *prove self* which reflected beliefs about requesting a higher salary.

Within each theme I discovered two contrasting points of view. This finding resulted in six categories, A-F (3 themes with 2 categories per theme). I classified all remarks into the six categories (or no category). The independent coder employed previously also classified remarks into one or more of the six categories or no category. The same remark was not classified into both categories of the same theme. We discussed and agreed about the final classifications. Inter-rater reliability was .86 before discussion and .97 after discussion (Miles & Huberman, 1994). To determine whether there was a relationship between the number of remarks made and the two categories for each theme I conducted three chi-square tests, one for each theme. I conducted chi-square tests based on remarks rather than negotiator because it was possible for a negotiator to make different remarks in both categories of the same theme. Thus, it would be difficult to classify that negotiator into only one category. However, I conducted t-tests to examine differences in the number of men and women negotiators in each category.

To understand the relationship between gender, orientation toward requests, and salary requests, I conducted a series of OLS regressions. Using an additive scale I created two independent variables to reflect orientation toward requests. The first reflected negotiators’ orientation toward requesting more than others and consisted of remarks made by each

negotiator in categories A, C, E. The second reflected negotiators' orientation toward requesting the same as others and consisted of remarks made by each negotiator in categories B, D, F (categories are explained in the next section). Initial salary request was the dependent variable. Because men and women differed as to whether they had a job offer, "have offer" was also entered in the regression equations.

RESULTS

Part I: Results from Negotiation Simulations and Questionnaires

Men's initial salary requests were significantly higher than women's (\$68,556, s.d. \$2,255 vs. \$67,000, s.d. \$1,871; $t(33, n = 35) = 2.23, p < .05$, two-tailed). Initial salary requests were significantly correlated with final salary outcomes ($r = .54, p = .001$). There were no significant differences in the amounts of bonus or tuition reimbursement men and women negotiated.² Results of pre- and post-negotiation questionnaires established that men and women negotiators did not differ significantly in terms of age, previous salary, GPA, importance of increasing negotiated salary, estimations of a fair negotiated salary, expected post-MBA salary, negotiation training, experience negotiating salary, or negotiation satisfaction. However, the two groups differed in that more men than women had an actual post-MBA job offer.

In a post-negotiation questionnaire negotiators were asked whether they had a strategy for the negotiation, and if so, what it was. Four of the thirty-eight negotiators, three women and one man, reported that their strategy was to "start high and work to a minimum accepted." Other negotiators did not report a strategy pertaining to requests.

² Men negotiated higher salaries than women (\$65,560, s.d. \$2,228 vs. \$64,559, s.d. \$2,331; $t(36, n = 38) = 1.35, p = .09$, one-tailed). While this difference was only marginally significant at $p = .10$, it was in the same direction as previous findings (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Stevens, Bavetta and Gist, 1993). One possible reason for the lack of strong statistical significance is that hiring managers were given a narrow salary range for increases (\$8,500) and negotiators were given a good deal of information about normative salaries for the school, the market, and other MBA students. These factors might have reduced the salary variation in this study as compared to others. In addition, while initial salary requests were strongly correlated with negotiated salaries, other factors not captured by this study also may have influenced final salaries.

Part II: Themes Emerging from Post-Negotiation Interviews

Three themes emerged from the interview data with each theme consisting of two contrasting categories. The first theme, *worth*, addresses the question “How much am I worth?” and focuses on the relationship negotiators perceive between worth and salary. Two distinct categories comprise this theme: salary represents an appraisal of my worth, I know what I am worth, and it is my responsibility to ensure the company pays me my worth (Category A: Know my worth) or I do not have a strong sense of my worth and it is the company’s responsibility to determine a fair salary (Category B: Unsure of my worth).

The second theme is *entitlement*. This theme focuses on negotiators’ feelings of entitlement to a higher salary and addresses the question “Should I be paid more than or the same as others?” Two distinct categories emerged: I am entitled to more than others (Category C: More than others) or I am entitled to the same as others (Category D: Same as others).

The third theme, *prove self*, addresses the question, “What do I need to do to show I deserve more?” Two distinct categories were expressed: I can (and need to) justify a salary greater than others’ by talking about my past experience and abilities during the negotiation (Category E: Prove myself in the negotiation) or I have to prove myself by doing the job or having previously done the job before I deserve a salary greater than others’ (Category F: Prove myself on the job).

Chi-square tests suggest an association between the number of remarks made by men and women and the different views represented by the two categories for each theme. These results are shown in Table 1. For the first theme, there was a significant relationship between the number of remarks men and women made and their beliefs about worth, with men making more remarks asserting that they knew their worth (85%) and women making more remarks indicating they were unsure (83%). For the second theme, there was a significant relationship between the number of remarks men and women made and their beliefs about entitlement, with men making

more remarks suggesting they were entitled to more than others (70%), and women making more remarks suggesting they were entitled to the same as others (71%). For the third theme, there was a significant relationship between the number of remarks men and women made and their beliefs about proving themselves, with men making more remarks indicating they could prove themselves in the negotiation (64%) and women making more remarks indicating that they needed to prove themselves on the job (83%).

T-tests showed that significantly more men were classified in categories A and C and significantly more women were classified in category B and D. There were no significant differences in the number of men and women classified in category E and the difference between the number of men and women classified in category F were marginally significant ($p = .07$). This suggests that both men and women believed they needed to prove themselves in the negotiation, but more women than men indicated they needed to prove themselves once they had the job in order to request an above-average salary. Overall, differences in the number of men and women negotiators classified in each category support the findings based on the number of remarks men and women made in each category.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

PART III: Analysis of Themes

A quantitative analysis of the negotiators' remarks suggests that men and women in the study perceived and evaluated their worth differently and held different beliefs about what they were entitled to and what they had to do to show they were entitled. In this part of the paper, excerpts flesh out and illustrate these themes.³ Supporting quotes are in Appendix B.

³ Names are pseudonyms that reflect the actual gender of the negotiator. Numbers following quotes indicate the line numbers on which the remark can be found in the original transcripts. Paralinguistic utterances, false starts, stuttering, and incomplete sentences with unclear meanings have been omitted from quotes. Missing words that complete a thought are bracketed. Explanatory text is in parentheses.

Worth: *Know my worth.* Category (A) reflects the belief that salary represents an appraisal of the negotiators' worth and that they can make that appraisal. Because these negotiators perceived they offered more to the organization in skills, talent or value, in short, were worth more, they argued they should be paid more. They arrived at this self-assessment in three ways. First, they argued they were worth more without providing a particular reason. They simply believed their worth was more than the salary offered. For example, when asked during the interview how he would feel about receiving the current offer, Joe explained, "I probably wouldn't feel very good, because I honestly think that my value is greater than the package ...that was offered me out there." (229-231). Second, they argued that they either brought special skills, knowledge or experience or that they would contribute more than others. Third, they argued that because they had another job offer higher than that of Indostar they were clearly worth more. For example, James explained, "...if I can walk, I can truly walk and go to another company and make more money, then that puts me in a position to kind of say, you know what, this is what I'm worth." (183-186).

Additionally, remarks in this category indicate how important it was to the negotiators to be paid what they believed they were worth. For example, when asked how the negotiation went, Ross said, "I did OK from changing the argument from how much money to how much are you worth. At least in concept I did that. ...And trying to show the different ways I can add value." (198-209). Mitch echoed this viewpoint, saying, "It's not getting more money, it's getting what you think you're worth." (98-101). These remarks reflect negotiators' comfort with conceiving of salary as a reflection of their worth and assigning a dollar value to themselves. They also illustrate how negotiators assumed responsibility for evaluating and helping determine their own worth rather than relying solely on the hiring organization's assessment.

Worth: *Unsure of my worth.* This category (B) reflects the difficulty these negotiators had thinking about their worth in monetary terms and assigning a dollar value to themselves.

They were uncertain over how to evaluate the value they brought the organization. For many, there seemed to be nothing on which to base this assessment. Equating salary and worth was ambiguous in the absence of concrete, quantifiable achievement. Isabelle explained,

You're trying to tell somebody that they should be paying you more for this work and it's not something that you can realistically judge. It's not like you pick so many berries and that's exactly how much money you make. You know it's, we've all been in that situation, it's - we can't. How do you put a price tag on this sort of thing? (89-94).

Given the ambiguity involved in assessing her potential future contribution to the organization (as opposed to the easily quantifiable task of being paid per pound of berries picked), Isabelle had difficulty assigning a higher dollar value to herself. Brenda mentioned the difficulty of arguing she was worth more. She said, "...you don't know if the other person thinks you're worthy of what you're asking for and you need to make the case that you are worthy and maybe the case you make is not, isn't – you know, the person is like, well, everybody's like that, so what makes you so special?" (260-264).

In addition to uncertainty about how to evaluate their monetary worth, remarks in this category also reflected negotiators' view that equating salary with worth was unfamiliar and uncomfortable because they did not conceptualize themselves in this way. Mary explained, "But I mean I have a hard time valuing people, valuing human beings, and for the most part, I have a hard time valuing, just putting a number, you know, [on] what I'm worth." (260-264).

These remarks also reflect negotiators' beliefs that their worth is defined by what the organization determines it will pay, and they indicate that while negotiators might influence the outcome, it is the company's responsibility to make this assessment. Sally described the situation as, "to an extent the amount a company pays a person is a statement of how much they value that individual, like how important are you to this organization." (570-573). During the interview, Susan first indicated that she should be paid what *she* feels she's worth, but she then

explained that her worth is established by the amount the company pays her. While it was important to her to have a high value placed on her, her remark suggests that her value is not something she can either independently assess or for which she has ultimate responsibility. She said, “I just feel like I should get paid what I feel like I'm worth. And my value is kind of interpreted in the amount that you are going to pay me or compensate me, and it's important for a company to value me. That's why I'm asking for more money.” (131-135). These remarks suggest that these negotiators regard the organization as the final arbiter of their value.

Entitlement: *I deserve more than others.* Remarks assigned to Category (C) indicate that the negotiators should receive a salary greater than their peers or above the average.⁴ Such remarks revealed that these negotiators considered themselves atypical MBA students. Ross explained, “I just tried to raise my value perceived to the firm. Saying, ‘Well, if it is a typical entry salary, I'm not a typical entry person, so you should make an adjustment.’” (37-39). Lewis also argued that he was not typical and therefore should not be compared with other MBAs. He explained his conversation with the hiring manager regarding the offer, “It was, ‘Well it's fine that that's what your standard offer is but I'm not a standard student and I don't think that I should be categorized in that same range of capability and therefore salary.’” (413-416).

These negotiators explained how their abilities made them more valuable than the average MBA student. James said, “I think it's fair to, with all due respect, compare yourself to your peers, and tout what you see as your personal competitive advantage over your peers. And in my case it's that I've got a track record of marketing success.” (439-443).

Entitlement: *I deserve the same as others.* Negotiators' remarks in this category (D) reflect their belief that they deserve the same salary as their peers, or the average salary. These

⁴ When they spoke of the “average” most negotiators interpreted this amount to be the \$67,000 their four marketing colleagues were receiving, rather than the \$63,000 figure that represented the school average. These dollar figures were provided by the simulation information.

negotiators argued that their skills, abilities, and experience were the same as others so their salary should also be the same. Leslie's comments illustrate this view. She said,

...coming out of a program like an MBA program, everybody is sort of at entry level so to speak, so it's not like I've ever worked for this particular company in this particular industry. And so in that sense I am very similar to my peers. (156-165).

Although negotiators at this stage did not believe they should receive an above-average salary, they wanted to receive at least the average salary or the same as their peers. Faith explained, "I would not have let myself get below that, but as long as I was making the average, that's all I really cared about... But making the average does matter. Because I don't want to feel like a chump." (315-323).

Prove self: *Prove self in the negotiation.* Category (E) represents negotiators' belief that they could justify their request for a higher salary by "showing" their value during the negotiation. Negotiators used descriptions of past accomplishments, experience, and descriptions of above-average ability to show they would be able to do the job, differentiate themselves from others, and justify their request for a higher salary. Aaron explained, "I think past success and example(s) of things you've done in the past are crucial in showing that you will do as promised. And I wanted to show that I had more skills than I believed - than the average person, and some experience and ability..." (103-109). Kyle also discussed how he was trying to "show" the hiring manager that his experience and ability exceeded others'. He said,

I wanted to show her that OK, I can do this better than most people because I understand things not only from experience, but also from my own personal skills. And if you want me, then you can't be giving me the same amount of money as everybody else...(90-96).

Prove self: *Prove self on the job.* Remarks in this category (F) reflect negotiators' sense that they needed to prove themselves by successfully performing the actual job for the company or have worked in that position previously before they could receive an above-average salary.

Although expressed in various ways, a common theme here was that the negotiators needed to demonstrate rather than talk about their abilities. Brenda explained,

I think in general it's just, sometimes it's hard to talk about yourself, and just say great things about yourself. It's just sort of a, - you tend to just be humble about yourself and just hope that people can see that you're a great person, at least in my experience. ...Sell yourself by what you do and not by what you say. I think that, I guess that it's a little different for me having to actually tell somebody that I'm great in this, versus them being able to see it. (308-319).

In addition to the difficulty of “saying great things about [oneself],” Brenda seems to question the legitimacy of talking about oneself to justify an increased salary. Isabelle's remarks echo Brenda's by expressing her sense of the difficulty of requesting a higher salary before having experience in the organization. She said, “You know it's difficult to ask someone to give you more money. I mean just the very sense of it, and trying to tell someone that you think that you're worth more money when you haven't worked for them.” (69-72).

PART IV: Correlations and Regression Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table 2. Gender is correlated with initial request ($p = .04$), oriented toward requesting more ($p = .03$), and oriented toward requesting the same ($p = .00$). Oriented toward requesting more and oriented toward requesting the same are correlated with initial requests ($p = .00$ and $p = .00$, respectively). Have offer is correlated with gender ($p = .04$), initial request ($p = .051$), and oriented toward requesting more ($p = .075$). Regression results show that when either orientation toward requests (*oriented toward requesting more or oriented toward requesting the same*) is entered into the equation with gender it becomes significant and gender is not significant (models 1, 2 & 3). This analysis suggests that orientation toward requests mediates the relationship between gender and the amount of first request (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The positive beta weight associated with *oriented toward*

requesting more suggests a positive relationship between this variable and requesting a higher salary, whereas the negative beta weight associated with *oriented toward requesting the same* suggests a negative relationship between this variable and requesting a higher salary. When both orientation toward request variables are entered into the regression model with have offer, have offer is not significant and each orientation toward requests variable is significant (Models 4, 5 & 6).⁵

INSERT TABLE 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE

DISCUSSION

This study suggests that negotiators' orientation toward requests plays a fundamental role in salary negotiation; those oriented toward requesting the same are likely to make smaller salary requests than others, which contribute to differences in outcomes. Not all men in this study indicated they were oriented toward requesting more than others. However, most women were oriented toward requesting the same as, but not more than, others. The orientation toward requesting more was comprised of three categories: I know my worth, I am entitled to more, and I need to prove myself in the negotiation. The orientation toward requesting the same was also comprised of three categories: I am unsure of my worth, I am entitled to the same, and I need to prove myself on the job. These beliefs were correlated with variation in men's and women's salary requests. By illuminating men's and women's beliefs about requesting a higher salary this study identifies potential proximal causes of differences in men's and women's salary requests.

Major (1994) argued that differences in men's and women's entitlement were due to several factors: group-based social inequities, intragroup and intrapersonal comparison biases, group differences in reference standards, legitimizing beliefs and attributions and group

⁵ These data do not speak to whether gender or have offer is a better predictor of initial requests. One man and five women did not have job offers. Thus, have offer is strongly related to gender.

differences in evaluations of pre-conditions. Other researchers (Wade, 2001) have argued that socialization pressures have caused women to assert themselves less. These arguments are compatible with the findings here and with each other. It is likely that both psychological processes and internalized societal constraints regarding entitlement affect women's salary negotiation beliefs and behavior. An important issue for future research is whether women who make higher-than-average requests are penalized as Wade (2001) suggests.

Personal entitlement was evoked by this context – where negotiators were trying to get something “extra” for themselves. In negotiations where men and women have to negotiate for resources for themselves, we might expect to see the same differences in their beliefs and outcomes. However, when men and women negotiate for others the belief systems and results might be more similar to each other because issues of personal entitlement are not likely to be activated (See Wade (2001) regarding negotiating for self versus another).

Men and women in this study tended to hold different beliefs about the need to prove themselves and their monetary worth. These beliefs are related in that estimates of one's monetary worth and how one may or may not have proven oneself already are likely to support beliefs about entitlement. While previous research has found that social comparison or feedback information ameliorates differences in men's and women's sense of entitlement to higher pay (Bylsma & Major, 1992), in these studies men and women actually completed a task, leaving no uncertainty about their ability to do the job. In this negotiation context, however, uncertainty existed and men and women appeared to respond to it differently. This finding corresponds to work by Heilman, Lucas & Kaplow (1990) which found that men appeared to make more favorable initial assessments of their personal or gender's abilities and research on uniqueness bias (Goethals, Messick & Allison, 1991) which suggests that men compared to women tend to overestimate the uniqueness of their characteristics or abilities.

Women's discomfort declaring their own monetary worth and their sense that they needed to prove themselves before being entitled to a higher-than-average salary might be justified. Research has shown that some groups (minority versus white executives) do have to spend more time than others proving themselves (Thomas and Gabarro, 1999). In addition, as a group, women are paid less than men (Moore, 1991; Blau & Kahn, 1997), believe they have to work harder or do more work to get the same rewards as men (Nieva & Gutek, 1981; Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984; Valian, 1999), and receive less money in controlled, experimental negotiations (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). These different experiences of being valued and having to prove themselves might also help account for differences found here in men's and women's ability to evaluate their own monetary worth and comfort doing so, as well as their beliefs about what they need to do to demonstrate they are worth more monetarily than others.

In addition, researchers have speculated that men and women traditionally have achieved their worth from different sources with men deriving worth from the market and women from the home (Eckert, 1993; Miller, 1986; Valian, 1999). Eckert (1993), argues "(w)hereas a man's personal worth is based on accumulation of goods, status, and power in the marketplace, a woman's worth is based on her ability to maintain order in, and control over, her domestic realm." (p. 34). Eckert suggests that instead of looking toward the marketplace to assess their worth as men do, women base their worth on an evaluation of their character. She argues, "...women's influence depends primarily on the accumulation of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1977): on the painstaking creation and elaboration of an image of the whole self as worthy of authority...The marketplace establishes the value of men's capital, but women's symbolic capital must be evaluated in relation to community norms for women's behavior." (1993: 34). Miller (1986) furthers this argument by suggesting that men are taught to center around themselves, whereas women are taught to center around the other. When women perform activity in their own self-interest, it is not seen as the basis for their self-worth. Rather, activity performed to

take care of and give to others constitutes women's self-worth (Miller, 1986). In line with this reasoning, determining a dollar value for one's worth is compatible with the way men learn to assess their worth, but not with the way women learn to assess theirs. Additionally, a woman's request for a higher salary could be perceived as aggressive and self-serving (Janoff-Bulman & Wade, 1996) as well as damaging to the relationship with the hiring manager.

Limitations

The study was built on a small sample that linked requests for a higher salary with a fine-grained analysis of beliefs about that behavior. Consequently, it suffers from the limitations that affect all studies with small samples. However this study provides new insight into the beliefs of a typical group of men and women MBA students and suggest reasons for differences in salary requests. Future studies using larger samples need to test these insights.

Because interviews were conducted after negotiations, it is possible that negotiators' comments were post-hoc justifications of their behavior rather than explanations of their belief systems. If this were the case, these findings would show gender differences in behavior and justifications for that behavior. While this interpretation is plausible, it is not clear why negotiators would feel the need to justify their behavior. Interview questions did not directly probe the amount negotiators requested, nor were negotiators aware of how much others requested. However, to address this issue future research should investigate negotiators' beliefs, before as well as after, negotiating.

This investigation used only female hiring managers and found differences between men and women negotiators under such conditions. Since other research (Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995) suggests that men and women can differ in the way they evaluate men and women in some circumstances, future research should examine behaviors and beliefs when men and women negotiate with male hiring managers. In addition, research needs to be conducted outside the MBA and U.S. population to determine the generalizability of these findings.

Lastly, more men than women in the sample had a post-MBA job offer. This may have affected women's requests for salary in the simulation. Differences in men's and women's job alternatives might be inextricably related to gender and sense of entitlement. However, such issues were not mentioned by participants in post-negotiation interviews, all were given the same alternative job scenario, and when surveyed, women expressed equal interest to men in increasing their salary. Future research needs to explore this issue. Although all negotiators had the same information about their alternatives, it is possible that men believed their unspecified alternative job offer was greater than women believed it was. This would have provided men with higher aspiration levels, causing them to anchor higher than women. There are no data to test this possibility directly. However, interview remarks do not indicate such differences.

Research Implications

The research reported here suggests that men and women might be operating under a different logic when requesting a higher salary (See Gersick, Bartunek & Dutton, 2000). These findings and findings regarding men's and women's approach to negotiation are in line with recent research suggesting men and women have different self-construals (Cross & Madson, 1997; Markus & Oyserman, 1993). Women, these researchers argue, are likely to have high relational interdependent self-construals which are characterized by seeing the self as connected to others, whereas men are more likely to have independent self-construals which are characterized by seeing the self as separate from others, autonomous, and unique. Individuals with a relational self-construal are likely to be concerned about promoting others' goals as well as their own and maintaining harmony (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Individuals with an independent self are likely to be concerned about highlighting their uniqueness and special qualities, and behaving in ways that cause them to stand out (Cross & Madson, 1997). Gelfand, et al. (2002) have suggested that negotiations characterized by stress and high-cognitive load are particularly likely to activate relational self-construals for women. Following this logic,

negotiators with a relational interdependent self-construal would be more comfortable seeing themselves as similar to others and reducing conflict by asking for the same as others. Negotiators with an independent self-construal would be more comfortable promoting themselves, viewing themselves as unique and feeling justified in asking for more. Men and women appeared to use the social comparison information provided differently. Women thought they should be paid the same as comparison others, whereas men thought they should be paid more. Cross, Morris, & Gore (2002) found that those with a highly relational self-construal tended to view themselves as more similar to friends than did those with a low relational self-construal. They suggest “individuals with a highly relational self-construal may not derive self-worth from perceptions that they are better than close others in important domains.” (2002: 413).

While this study details the proximal beliefs experienced by these negotiators, the relational interdependent and independent self-construal framework provides a broader context for understanding men’s and women’s negotiation behavior. The application of this framework to these data raises interesting questions. Both Cross & Madson (1997) and Gelfand, et al. (2002) suggest that individuals high in relational interdependent self-construal can suppress this self-construal should they choose. What triggers the relational self-construal and how can negotiators monitor it? Does the relational self-construal become active only in relationships with close others? How do we define these types of relationships? Future research exploring this theoretical framework and men’s and women’s negotiation beliefs and behavior holds promise for improved understanding of gender differences in negotiation.

CONCLUSION

Initial requests have been found to have an impact on final offers. Although the differences in men’s and women’s negotiated salaries were marginally significant in this study, men’s and women’s initial requests for a higher salary were significantly correlated with their final negotiated salaries. Understanding more about men’s and women’s initial salary requests

and the beliefs that influence them is important if we want to know more about men's and women's final negotiated salaries.

It is likely that men's and women's salary negotiation behavior is multiply determined. Beliefs about the self, entitlement, other opportunities and one's value in the workplace are likely to have an impact on salary negotiation behavior, with beliefs about entitlement being more proximally related to behavior. Like research by Stevens, et al. (1993) and Kray, et al. (2001), this study suggests that cognitive variables or beliefs might prevent students from incorporating learned skills. For example, Kray, et al. (2001) found that when reactance to stereotype threat was activated prior to negotiating, women performed better in claiming gains, or asking for more, for themselves than when not. Similarly, Stevens, et al. (1993) found that giving women self-management training designed to cope with negative reactions from one's negotiation partner improved their ability to claim salary gains. While not wanting to fall into the trap of arguing women are deficient (Kolb & Williams, 2000), it is helpful to understand the belief systems that support and deter claiming higher salaries. From a pragmatic point of view, this research suggests that when teaching negotiators, both beliefs and behaviors need to be addressed. Belief systems not in concert with newly learned negotiation behaviors might prevent negotiators from enacting these behaviors.

Women who are negotiating might need to be trained to ask for a higher salary than originally planned and to focus, in a positive way, on the reasons they are entitled to this salary. Additionally, it might be important for women to frame their own beliefs and any discussion of worth in a way that is palatable to them. For example, one woman in this study discussed how much her "skills" were worth. This way of depersonalizing "how much one is worth" might be a successful technique for negotiators who are uncomfortable with the idea of worth as applied to the self and salary.

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TABLE 1**Differences in Number of Remarks Made by Category**

	Men's Remarks	Women's Remarks	Chi-Square
A: Worth: Know my worth.	(41/48) 85%	(7/48) 15%	$\chi^2 = 41.57,$ df=1, p<.01
B: Worth: Unsure of my worth.	(7/41) 17%	(34/41) 83%	
C: Entitlement: Entitled to more than others.	(31/44) 70%	(13/44) 30%	$\chi^2 = 13.70,$ df=1, p<.01
D: Entitlement: Entitled to the same as others.	(10/35) 29%	(25/35) 71%	
E: Prove Self: Prove myself in the negotiation.	(16/25) 64%	(9/25) 36%	$\chi^2 = 12.35,$ df=1, p<.01
F: Prove Self: Prove myself on the job.	(5/29) 17%	(24/29) 83%	

TABLE 2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations between Variables

Variable	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4
1. Initial Request (Anchor)	67,824	2,222				
2. Oriented toward requesting more	3.44	4.18	.62***			
3. Oriented toward requesting the same	3.09	2.99	-.52***	-.42**		
4. Gender ^a	.47	.51	-.36**	-.37**	.67***	
5. Have offer	.82	.39	.34*	.32*	-.21	-.36**

^aMale = 0, Female = 1

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01; n = 34 (except have offer where n=33)

TABLE 3

Results of Regression Analysis for Initial Request

Predictors ^a	(1) n=34	(2) n=34	(3) n=34	(4) n=33	(5) n=33	(6) n=33
Gender ^b	-.36** (-2.15)	-.15 (-.97)	-.01 (-.03)			
Have Offer				.34* (2.03)	.16 (1.10)	.25 (1.61)
Oriented toward requesting more		.56*** (3.74)			.58*** (3.93)	
Oriented toward requesting same			-.52** (-2.50)			-.46*** (-3.01)
R ²	.13	.40	.27	.12	.42	.32
F	4.61**	10.21***	5.82***	4.14*	10.74***	7.13***

^aEntries are standardized regression coefficients; values in parentheses are t's;

^bMale = 0, Female = 1

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

APPENDIX A

<p>Value/Worth – Remarks reflect, define, or delineate a relationship between the negotiator’s value or worth and salary or money. Remarks suggest an evaluation of the desirability of the negotiator in monetary terms. Remarks often, but not always, include the words “value”, “undervalue”, “worth”, “self-worth”, or “worthiness” or the concept of worth or valuing themselves and their abilities or contribution to the organization.</p>
<p>Entitlement - Remarks suggest a) sense of entitlement to a higher salary, b) deservingness of a higher salary, or c) negotiator should (implied moral imperative or right) receive a higher salary now. Remarks often indicate it is “fair” or “right” to receive a salary increase. Remarks make a claim of deservingness. Remarks expressing desire but not implying deservingness, entitlement, fairness, or a right to should not be coded with this code.</p>
<p>Market Average – Remarks state or imply that negotiators expect, want, deserve, or believe they should be paid the average salary or the same as others. Remarks can also focus on how the negotiators determine that they should be paid the average salary. Emphasis is on “I’m equal” so I should be paid the same.</p>
<p>Market vs. Premium - Remarks indicate the negotiator thinks they should be paid above the average or a salary premium – e.g. more than their peers, more than comparable salaries, more than entry salaries or more than the average salary. Remarks can also explain, justify, or provide reasons why the negotiator should receive this premium. Emphasis is often on “I’m contributing more” so I should be paid more.</p>
<p>Prove Self A - Remarks indicate negotiators need to prove or demonstrate their ability to do the work or to actually do the job before a higher than average salary (or sometimes an increase in salary) is justified. Or, they indicate they needed to have worked in that industry or in that job to have already “proven” they can do the job.</p>
<p>Prove Self B - Remarks indicate negotiators can discuss past experiences and abilities to “prove” they can do job. They indicate “I can prove myself in the negotiation or I can prove I can do this job by telling you what I’ve done.”</p>

APPENDIX B
Negotiators' Interview Remarks

<p>Worth (A) Know my worth.</p>	<p>I think that I was worth, that I felt I was worth more, that I could get paid more. (Lewis, 108-110)</p> <p>Well I think I base it (salary) upon my own evaluation of my skills and abilities...(Tom, 163-165)</p>
<p>Worth (B) Unsure of my worth</p>	<p>You want some company that is willing to recognize your value and say, ‘ For you, we're willing to do this much.’ (Anthony, 95-96)</p> <p>I'm worth the average, ...the money doesn't make the difference. It was more just how valued am I by the company? (Sally, 132-139)</p>
<p>Entitlement (C) Entitled to more</p>	<p>...if that's what everyone else is getting, I'm better than everyone else, so I should be getting more than that, right? (Mitch, 118-122)</p> <p>When I came in my target was to exceed 64...which is a small amount above the average. (George, 109-111)</p>
<p>Entitlement (D) Entitled to same</p>	<p><And what made you think that that (\$63,000) would be good?> Because, it’s the industry standard and I’m just coming out of school. I mean it’s not like I’ve done this job for ten years so I can’t say, ‘Hey, you have to pay me \$5,000 more than everybody else because I have this like outstanding skill that I’ve developed.’ (Kelly, 229-233)</p> <p>< How do you determine what's fair?> Just based on what my classmates were getting. (Everett, 20-21)</p>
<p>Prove Self (E) Prove myself in</p>	<p>I'm trying to differentiate myself from my peers ... And I'm trying to give her a reason to give me more money... (James, 683-686)</p>

the negotiation	So basically I just isolated out some examples of things that I have done in the past that would show her that I had those skills and to really refresh or explain my position and what I can bring to the table that fit what the company was looking for. (Aaron, 69-73)
Prove Self (F) Prove myself on the job	<p>... I said that in three months or whatever they could review me and then we'd - so give them an opportunity to see how I work, and whether it merits a higher salary. (Rebecca, 19-24).</p> <p>I expected that she could not raise her salary by a ton, but what I wanted her to say to me is that there would be room for me to show what I was worth, and be able to kind of set goals for myself with the company, to determine that if I reach these goals, then that's where I'd find my salary increases and whatnot in the future." (Rachael, 111-116).</p>